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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is not uncommon today for Americans to reference their lives in 
binary fashion: for many, time is now divided quite simply into life pre- and 
post-September 11, 2001.  I have only been a law professor in a post-9/11 
world.  In one sense this is unfortunate, because I cannot offer insights into 
the differences between teaching Federal Indian Law and Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez,1 in particular, before and after 9/11.  On the other hand, 
because I did not teach this controversial case in the late 1970s when it was 
decided—at the height of the feminist movement and on the heels of 
America’s civil rights revolution—my perspective on the case is decidedly 
post-feminist, post-modern, and assuredly post-9/11. 
 
 ∗J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A. University of Oklahoma.  Associate Professor of Law, 
Southwestern University School of Law; Justice, Citizen Potawatomi Nation Supreme Court.  
This article incorporates ideas explored more fully in two forthcoming articles concerning law, 
liberalism, and tribal governance: Angela R. Riley, Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming June 2007) [hereinafter Illiberalism]; Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance 
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2007) [hereinafter Governance].  Many thanks to Professors 
Matthew Fletcher and Wenona Singel for inviting me to present this paper at North Dakota School 
of Law American Indian Law’s Pedagogy Conference.  Thanks also to the conference participants 
and the North Dakota Law Review for their thoughtful input on this work.  Kristen Carpenter 
graciously read and provided comments on early drafts.  SoYun Roe and Alexander Maleki 
provided outstanding research assistance. 
1. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
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Since it was decided, Santa Clara Pueblo has proven itself an 
extremely controversial case.  An examination of recently published law 
review articles, books, and cases indicates that there is a renewed interest in 
Santa Clara Pueblo today.  The forces behind this trend—which is the 
subject of this essay—influence the way I approach, teach, and contemplate 
this very provocative decision that is now clearly situated in the canon of 
American Indian law. 
I contend there are two, interrelated events giving rise to renewed 
interest in Santa Clara Pueblo.  First, the relatively high-profile nature of 
Indian gaming has put the previously unknown inner workings of tribal 
governments under intense scrutiny; and, secondly, the events of September 
11 have fueled rapidly changing conceptions of sovereignty and govern-
mental responsibility across the globe. 
We’ve all heard news of the purportedly massive increase in civil 
rights claims (including allegations of banishment and disenrollment, 
among others) brought by tribal members against their own governments.2  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the vast majority of such claims reported in the 
mainstream media are initiated against tribes that are generating significant 
gaming revenues.3  Thus, for the CNN junkie or casual Indian law con-
sumer, the insularity of tribal governments becomes conflated with money 
and greed.  Combined with the knowledge that Santa Clara Pueblo fore-
closed federal court review of tribal court decisions, fear and suspicion of 
tribal governments is only exacerbated. 
With Indian tribes already under increased scrutiny because of the 
gaming backlash, they are growing even more vulnerable to criticism as the 
world begins to look skeptically on claims of sovereignty.  The terrorist 
attacks of September 11 inspired an already growing global consensus that 
the nature of state sovereignty is changing.4  Today, many people believe 
that there can be no sovereignty for a state that does not respect individual 
civil liberties and human rights.5  Accordingly, given that Santa Clara 
Pueblo has become symbolic of the federal courts’ deference to tribal 
sovereignty—even when tribal court decisions are seemingly inapposite to 
 
2. See infra notes 41-43. 
3. See, e.g., Michael Hiltzik, Fairness Is the Loser in Tribal Identity Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
5, 2004, at C1 (“Tribes with multimillion dollar casinos are ejecting members by the score, 
questioning ties of heritage and blood that hadn’t been challenged in three or four generations.”). 
4. See, e.g., Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2043-51 (2003); 
Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, 6 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 841, 842 (2003) [hereinafter Raustiala, Rethinking]. 
5. Stacy, supra note 4, at 2050. 
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Western liberal ideals—tribal governments and Santa Clara Pueblo, by 
extension, are viewed with increased skepticism. 
This unique confluence of events informs the way I approach Santa 
Clara Pueblo in the classroom.6  For me, teaching this controversial case in 
a post-9/11 world means viewing it through an international lens.  
Specifically, it requires that Indian law scholars—particularly those of us 
who promote tribal self-governance and tribal autonomy—look seriously at 
growing global concerns regarding sovereignty, and also contemplate the 
relevance of these changes to the future of Indian Nations. 
II. SANTA CLARA PUEBLO 
A. BACKGROUND 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez involved a dispute over the 
membership status of the children of Julia Martinez, a member of Santa 
Clara Pueblo, and her husband, Myles Martinez, a Navajo.7  The Santa 
Clara Pueblo passed a membership ordinance in 1939 which stated that 
children of females who married outside the Pueblo were not members, 
while the children of men who married outside the Pueblo could be 
members.8  Unable to persuade the Pueblo to change its membership rules, 
Julia Martinez and her daughter filed a lawsuit under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) in federal court, asking the court to invalidate 
the ordinance and require the Pueblo to include her children as members.9 
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote for the majority, focusing, in 
particular, on the purposes behind the ICRA and the Pueblo’s right to self-
determination and continued existence.10  First, the Court noted that Title I 
of the ICRA imposed “certain restrictions upon tribal governments similar, 
but not identical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”11  The Court expressly held that tribal courts could give 
effect to norms imposed by the ICRA in ways that are in keeping with 
 
6. I teach this case in my Federal Indian Law course as well as in my seminar, “Illiberal 
Groups in the Liberal State.” 
7. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 52 (1978).  See Judith Resnik, Dependent 
Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 672 (1989) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns]. 
8. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 52 n.2.  See Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns, supra note 7, 
at 672. 
9. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 53.  See Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns, supra note 7, at 
672. 
10. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 62.  See also Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American 
Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 433, 445-46 (2005). 
11. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 57. 
      
956 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82:953 
traditional tribal structures.12  The Court recognized that membership 
decisions are at the core of tribal self-government and that the Pueblo are in 
the best position to determine what it means to be Santa Claran.13 
Marshall also took up the question of sovereign immunity—that is, 
whether a tribal nation, as a separate sovereign from the United States, 
could ever be sued in federal court absent a clear waiver of immunity by the 
tribe or by Congress.  Finding no such waiver within the statute, the Court 
concluded that the tribe could not be sued under the ICRA in federal 
court.14  Marshall went on to point out that “[t]ribal forums are available to 
vindicate rights created by the ICRA.”15  He emphasized: “Tribal courts 
have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive 
adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests 
of both Indians and non-Indians.”16  The Court made no exception for tribes 
in which judicial authority is vested in a nonjudicial entity, such as (in the 
case of the Santa Clara Pueblo) a tribal council, calling such fora 
“competent law-applying bodies.”17 
 
12. Id. at 72. 
13. Id. at 72 n.32.  See also Frickey, supra note 10, at 445-46. 
14. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58-59.  The Court pointed out that, when a petitioner 
brings a habeas corpus action in federal court, the respondent in the action is the individual 
custodian of the prisoner, not the tribe.  Id.  Therefore, the ICRA’s habeas provision cannot be 
read as a general waiver of the tribe’s sovereign immunity.  Id. 
15. Id. at 65. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 66.  Many tribal courts have interpreted the ICRA—as analyzed by Santa Clara 
Pueblo—as creating an implied waiver of tribal sovereign immunity in tribal courts for purposes 
of ICRA claims.  See Alexander Tallchief Skibine, Respondent’s Brief: Reargument of Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 79, 86 (2004) (stating that “most tribal 
courts interpret the ICRA as an implied waiver of the tribes’ sovereign immunity in their own 
tribal courts and have taken seriously their role in implementing the Act’s protections.”) (citations 
omitted).  Others expressly waive their immunity for civil rights suits in tribal courts through their 
tribal constitutions; see, e.g., MENOMINEE INDIAN TRIBE CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1-2 (1977) 
(waiving tribal immunity in tribal court for Indian Civil Rights Act cases); see also Carole E. 
Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 889, 900 (2003) (“Most 
tribal courts or councils waive sovereign immunity so as to enable litigants to challenge actions of 
tribal officers for violating the Act.”); Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The 
Indian Bill of Rights at Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 465, 480-83 (1998) (discussing those 
tribal courts that have found tribal sovereign immunity to be waived for purposes of ICRA 
claims).  Cf. Peter Nicolas, American-Style Justice in No Man’s Land, 36 GA. L. REV. 895, 959 
(2002). 
A number of tribal courts have held that ICRA does not abrogate a tribe’s sovereign 
immunity in tribal court and have declined to entertain suits brought against tribes 
under ICRA.  Accordingly, even for violations of ICRA, injured parties find them-
selves without a forum in which to adjudicate their claims against these tribes. 
Id.; Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of 
Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 479, 509 (2000) (“The doctrine 
of tribal sovereign immunity, however, is a potential doctrinal obstacle to the tribal courts’ 
functioning as fora to vindicate ICRA rights.”).  Despite its controversial nature, tribal sovereign 
immunity is essential to tribal self-government.  See generally Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations 
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Much of the Court’s rationale rested on its simultaneous faith in tribal 
dispute forums and its concern over the competency of the federal courts to 
decide issues critical to tribal governance.  Marshall revealed great unease 
at the prospect of authorizing the federal courts to adjudicate disputes 
within Indian tribes, maintaining that to do so would threaten the survival of 
the community as a distinct group.18  The Court stated: “[R]esolution of 
statutory issues under [the ICRA] . . . will frequently depend on questions 
of tribal tradition and custom which tribal forums may be in a better 
position to evaluate than federal courts.”19  Also, “efforts by the federal 
judiciary to apply [the ICRA] . . . may substantially interfere with a tribe’s 
ability to maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity.”20  
Accordingly, the Court construed the ICRA narrowly and held that the only 
remedy in federal court was for habeas corpus violations as expressly 
provided for in the statute.  The Court declined to imply a right of action, 
holding that to do so would undermine Congress’s purpose in protecting 
tribal sovereignty and the Pueblo’s right of self government.21 
B. REACTION TO THE CASE 
Santa Clara Pueblo caused a furor.  The Court’s deference to tribal 
sovereignty allowed the Santa Clara Pueblo to continue to determine its 
membership pursuant to sexually discriminatory membership rules.22  
Dozens of law review articles were inspired by the Court’s controversial 
opinion.23  Professor Robert Laurence calls it “the single most interesting 
case in all of Anglo-American jurisprudence.”24  It stands today as one of 
the most cited cases in American law.25 
After the decision came down, commentary flooded in from all sides.  
Mainstream feminists, constitutional law scholars, and civil rights 
 
and Tribal Self-Governance, 80 N.D. L. REV. 691, 708 (2004) (discussing the importance to self-
governance of tribal sovereign immunity for tribal governments in federal courts). 
18. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 71. 
19. Id. at 71. 
20. Id. at 71-72. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 72. 
23. Though not a definitive resource for determining Santa Clara Pueblo’s popularity, it is 
worth noting that the Westlaw search (“Santa Clara Pueblo” & “tribal sovereignty”) yields 630 
articles; the search (“Santa Clara Pueblo” & “discrimination”) produces 474 hits; and a search of 
articles with the case name in the title identifies ten articles. 
24. Robert Laurence, A Quincentennial Essay on Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 28 IDAHO 
L. REV. 307, 307 (1991-92). 
25. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Racial Equality: Old and New Strains and American 
Indians, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333, 362 (2004). 
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advocates wrote passionately about the case and its implications.26  Some of 
the most distinguished legal scholars in North America—including Will 
Kymlicka,27 Catherine MacKinnon,28 Judith Resnik,29 and Amy 
Gutmann30—feverishly produced scholarship on the topic.  And Indian 
law’s most highly respected scholars—Gloria Valencia-Weber,31 Carole 
Goldberg,32 Christine Zuni Cruz, and Alexander Tallchief Skibine,33 among 
others—have strategically taken on Santa Clara’s critics through 
scholarship of their own.34 
In my own work, I have grappled with the intriguing and, oftentimes, 
thorny implications of this case.  Of note is how widely known Santa Clara 
Pueblo is beyond the field of Indian law.  On the one hand, I credit the case 
for bringing to light the existence of tribal governments for those who 
previously had little knowledge or interest in Indian law.  On the other 
hand, I lament the fact that, oftentimes, Santa Clara Pueblo’s fame means it 
is the only Indian law case legal scholars outside of the Indian law 
community have heard of.35  Thus, Santa Clara Pueblo shapes outsiders’ 
perceptions of American Indians, tribal governments, and the brand of 
justice available in the tribal courts.  In this sense, it inspires continued 
suspicion and scrutiny of Indian tribes. 
Despite the resurgence in its popularity (or infamy, as the case may be), 
there has been little scholarship examining Santa Clara Pueblo through a 
 
26. Id. at 363. 
27. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY 
RIGHTS 38, 165 (1995). 
28. CATHERINE MACKINNON, Whose Culture? A Case Note on Martinez v. Santa Clara 
Pueblo, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 63 (1987) (arguing that 
Pueblo tribal governance is rooted in male supremacy). 
29. Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns, supra note 7, at 702 (discussing sovereignty and 
membership through Santa Clara Pueblo and noting that neither the membership rule nor the 
resulting lawsuit can be understood outside of a federal Indian law context). 
30. See AMY GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 45 (2003). 
31. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, supra note 25, at 362 (stating that “[t]he litigation revisited 
what had been historical problems at Santa Clara Pueblo: individual claims to the communal land, 
often by non-members, in challenge to the tribal government’s cultural system to protect resources 
for the community.”). 
32. See Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Requirements for Indian 
Nations, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 437, 448 (2002) (arguing that, despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Santa Clara Pueblo, “federal involvement in tribal decision-making about citizenship is alive and 
well”). 
33. See Skibine, supra note 17, at 87. 
34. Cf. Laurence, supra note 24, at 338 (arguing that, since the ICRA is a check on tribal 
unfairness and Santa Clara Pueblo limits the reach of the ICRA, Santa Clara Pueblo should be 
reversed). 
35. Riley, Illiberalism, supra note *. 
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post-9/11 lens.36  Certainly, the case is still heavily cited in works dis-
cussing the inextricably connected matters of gender discrimination,37 
multicultural citizenship,38 law and religion, and sovereign immunity.39  
But, as the next part sets forth, I believe that Santa Clara Pueblo can only 
be understood in a contemporary context if it is viewed through the lens of 
changing global conceptions of sovereignty and the freedom (or lack 
thereof) of sovereign states to govern illiberally.40 
III. CONTEMPORARY CIRCUMSTANCES 
A. RENEWED SCRUTINY OF SANTA CLARA PUEBLO 
Given that Santa Clara Pueblo was decided nearly three decades ago, it 
is curious that it is experiencing a revival in legal literature today.  As stated 
at the outset, I attribute this renewed interest to the convergence of two 
seemingly unrelated phenomena.  First, news of massive gaming revenues 
by Indian tribes has invited significant scrutiny of internal tribal disputes, 
including high-profile banishment and disenrollment cases.  Additionally, 
in a post-9/11 world, scrutiny of all governments—tribal and otherwise—
has been enhanced, as there is today an increased focus on sovereign 
nations’ compliance (or lack thereof) with international human rights 
standards.41 
1. Indian Gaming 
News reports of banishment and disenrollment of individual Indians by 
wealthy tribes, in particular, are fueling deeply embedded misconceptions 
about tribal governments.42  Though it’s not clear that there are more 
 
36. Cf. Robert Laurence, Don’t Think Like a Hippopotamus: An Essay on First-Year 
Contracts, Earthquake Prediction, Gun Control in Bagdad, The Indian Civil Rights Act, the Clean 
Water Act, and Justice Thomas’s Separate Opinion in United States v. Lara, 40 TULSA L. REV. 
137 (2004) (comparing the United States Government’s attempt to bring democracy to Iraq with 
the Indian Civil Rights Act) [hereinafter Laurence, Hippopotamus]. 
37. Resnik,  Dependent Sovereigns, supra note 7, at 715, 722. 
38. KYMLICKA, supra note 27, at 233 n.4. 
39. See, e.g., Note, In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1058 (1982) 
(discussing Santa Clara Pueblo and its effects on tribal sovereign immunity). 
40. Riley, Illiberalism, supra note *. 
41. Stacy, supra note 4, at 2043-51. 
42. See, e.g., Hiltzik, supra note 3, at C1 (discussing a case at the Redding Rancheria where 
76 members of one family were expelled from the tribe allegedly because the relative to whom 
they traced their ancestry had never borne children); James May, Tribal Recall: Members 
Disenrolled After Financial Dispute, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Dec. 8, 2003, available at 
http://www.indiancountry.com (follow “ICT Archives” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 21, 2006) 
(stating that disenrolled members allege the tribal government defeated the recall by disqualifying 
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membership disputes today than in the past, they are certainly more widely 
reported than before.43  Tribes concede that they are carefully scrutinizing 
tribal membership decisions.  One reason is that casino wealth has attracted 
masses of people who wouldn’t have bothered to claim tribal membership 
before.44  Thus, tribes are faced with the unenviable task of verifying the 
membership of new and existing members. 
News reports of tribal members suffering disenrollment or banishment 
after, for example, contesting the scope of tribal leaders’ powers, alleging 
civil rights violations, or opposing major economic development projects 
have added to negative public sentiments about tribal governments.  Many 
tribes believe this is due much more to a backlash over gaming than anger 
over civil rights violations of individual tribal members.45  But, in any case, 
civil rights lawyers (including Indian attorneys themselves) are aggressively 
representing individual Indians and pressing for federal court review of 
tribal court decisions.  These cases appear to inspire a level of opposition to 
tribal governments—coming especially from tribal members themselves—
that was not seen immediately following Santa Clara Pueblo. 
Judith Resnik once wrote that Santa Clara Pueblo was an “easy case” 
for the Supreme Court, because it accorded with federal norms about the 
treatment of women.46  However “easy” the Court’s decision was in 1978, I 
contend that a reversal of Santa Clara Pueblo—by either the courts or 
Congress—would be comparably effortless today.  As we all know, the 
stakes in tribal membership are now very different than they were thirty 
years ago.  And, I contend that, to an Anglo world, they are perceptibly 
higher than they were at the time of Santa Clara Pueblo.  We don’t know if 
Resnik’s theory was correct: that is, that the Court declined to decide for 
Martinez because it was comfortable reflecting its own (as well as 
society’s) bias against women. But I am confident in suggesting that 
today’s Court—and much of the Western world—even if unsympathetic to 
 
members facing disenrollment and adding members from outside the tribe to participate in the 
vote). 
43. See Hiltzik, supra note 3, at C1. 
44. Id. (quoting Professor Carole Goldberg as saying, “Tribes are taking a closer look.  It 
didn’t use to matter so much if you made one or two mistakes.”). 
45. Brendan Ludwick, The Scope of Federal Authority Over Tribal Membership Disputes 
and the Problem of Disenrollment, 51 FED. LAW. 37, 43 (Oct. 2004). 
46. Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns, supra note 7, at 727.  For a different view of the Court’s 
decision, see Bethany Berger, Indian Policy and the Imagined Indian Woman, 14 KAN. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 103 (2004). 
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claims of gender bias, are deeply concerned about allegations of financial 
harm.47 
The scrutiny of tribal governments is only going to increase as Indian 
tribes continue to operate profitable gaming operations.  It is, therefore, 
unsurprising that tribal banishment and disenrollment cases are being 
framed largely in terms of lost economic benefits, rather than cultural or 
communal loss.  Thus, I boldly suggest that, even if (perhaps perceived)48 
gender discrimination was not enough to move the Court to abrogate tribal 
sovereignty in 1978, the perception that individuals are being deprived 
significant gaming revenues just might be enough to do so today. 
I do not know for certain whether this theory, which connects the rise 
in Indian gaming to encroachments on tribal sovereignty, is correct.  And, 
while I think the answer to the question is important, it is not dispositive.  
The fact is, there are other compelling reasons for tribal governments to 
undertake a critical and comprehensive examination of tribal governance 
systems.  This is important, not only so we can avoid greater infringements 
on our sovereignty by the outside world, but so we can work towards more 
effectively serving the needs of our people. 
2. Sovereignty in a Post-9/11 World 
In my writings I have advocated that tribes embrace a concept I call 
“living sovereignty.”49  By this, I mean that tribal governments—if they  
seek to be treated as sovereigns—ought to act accordingly, without 
allowing the colonial powers to limit their vision of governance.50  In my 
own Federal Indian Law course, I take as a given that Indian tribes are 
sovereign, or at least that they enjoy internal—if not all external—attributes 
of sovereignty.51  But I have come to see that tribal sovereignty is tricky 
business.  As sovereign nations, tribes owe duties to their people.  And, as 
 
47. For example, the Cobell case, which involves individual trust accounts, has garnered 
much more attention from the mainstream media than tribal claims for reclamation of communal 
lands and/or issues surrounding indigenous culture or sacred sites.   
48. See Rina Swentzell, Testimony of a Santa Clara Woman, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 97 
(2004) (explaining that the Santa Clara Pueblo were not traditionally patriarchal, but revered both 
genders for creating balance in the universe, and telling the story of her own children who—
though not born to Santa Claran fathers—lived their lives at the Pueblo). 
49. Angela R. Riley, “Straight Stealing”: Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural 
Property Protection, 80 WASH. L. REV. 69, 119 (2005) [hereinafter Riley, Straight Stealing]. 
50. Id. (“The act of ‘living sovereignty’ is not and should not be dependant on the colonizer’s 
attempts to limit indigenous nations.”). 
51. The inability of Indian nations, for example, to negotiate with other states on the 
international plane may negate, by some definitions, their sovereignty.  See Harold Hongju Koh, 
On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (2003) (stating that the modern 
definition of “sovereignty” refers to a nation-state’s “capacity to participate in international 
affairs”).   
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we have learned in the wake of 9/11—if we were not aware of it already—
more is required today of sovereign nation-states than ever before.52 
Santa Clara Pueblo’s holding—that sovereignty insulates tribal court’s 
ICRA decisions against federal court review (save habeas), even when 
tribal rulings are seemingly inapposite to American civil rights norms—
invites the questions that loomed after September 11: To what extent ought 
sovereignty shield nations from the imposition of outside forces when there 
are legitimate concerns that the polity living under those governments are 
being treated unfairly, or are subject to the tyranny of an illiberal regime?  
Is sovereignty—tribal or otherwise—improperly being used as a shield 
against governmental abuses of human rights? 
While I do not attempt to answer these very provocative, hard 
questions here, I do consider them to be of imminent importance.  And, 
when teaching Santa Clara Pueblo, I raise them to inspire students to 
undertake a critical examination of the legitimacy of sovereignty. 
Today sovereignty is being re-examined on a global front.53  There is 
now a massive body of literature devoted to detailing sovereignty’s evolu-
tion.54  Specifically, in the wake of globalization, it appears that the nation-
state is shrinking, or at least is becoming less relevant.55  Scholars argue 
that the old Westphalian model of sovereignty that under girds the territorial 
state system “has never been absolute and is increasingly compromised.”56  
As the world becomes more interconnected, territorial sovereignty feels 
more and more remote. 
Until now, sovereignty has protected the state from interference by 
outsiders.57  It has, in a broad sense, “permit[ted] a polity to define and 
govern itself freely.”58  However, sovereignty’s protective role is increas-
ingly questioned, particularly as some scholars allege that sovereignty is 
 
52. I am not the first to make a connection between the United States’ actions in Iraq and the 
sovereignty of Indian tribes.  See, e.g., Laurence, Hippopotamus, supra note 36, at 140 (question-
ing the United States’ legitimate authority to occupy Indian country and/or Iraq). 
53. Stacy, supra note 4, at 2043-51.  See Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to 
Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 
1960 (2003). 
54. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 305, 
306 (2001); Raustiala, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 842 (“Sovereignty is often defined as supreme 
and independent power or authority in government as possessed or claimed by a state or 
community in a defined territory.”). 
55. Stacy, supra note 4, at 2043 (distinguishing article from two historical conceptions of 
sovereignty put forth by Locke and Hobbes).  Cf. Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE 
L.J. 1399, 1407 (2003) (referring to religion and culture as “the New Sovereignty”). 
56. Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2513 (2005) 
[hereinafter Raustiala, Geography]. 
57. Raustiala, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 875. 
58. Id. 
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being used as a shield for states that don’t uphold human rights and civil 
liberties.59  These same critics contend that sovereignty impedes effective 
intervention in dealing with human rights issues.60 
As human rights discourse grows, sovereignty is ever more reliant on 
perceived notions of “good governance.”  That is, greater emphasis is being 
placed on the duties owed to citizens by sovereign governments, rather then 
merely focusing on the benefits to which a nation is entitled per its 
sovereignty.61  Helen Stacy titles this phenomenon “relational sovereignty” 
and argues that it “places a higher obligation on the sovereign state to care 
for and regulate the behavior of its citizens both inside and outside state 
borders.”62  In short, today a nation’s sovereignty is equal to the degree of 
care the government undertakes for its citizens.63 
As I stated at the outset, when teaching Santa Clara Pueblo, I situate 
the discussion in the larger framework of these changing global conceptions 
of sovereignty.  And, in fact, I explain to my students that I am in agree-
ment that national sovereignty and respect for human rights must go hand in 
hand.  But I accept this premise with one important caveat.  That is, the 
status of Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations”64—whose territory 
is encompassed within a larger, dominant government—significantly com-
plicates these issues.  Thus, I contend that today’s “human rights culture”65 
must not only contemplate the claims of individual Indians vis-à-vis tribal 
governments.  It must also encompass indigenous peoples’ claims of self-
determination and sovereignty vis-à-vis the dominant state. 
Virtually all indigenous nations exist within the borders of larger 
nation-states who owe them duties.  All too often, the relationship between 
indigenous groups and the nations in which they reside is marked by a 
denial or complete abrogation of the responsibilities owed to indigenous 
peoples.  Accordingly, indigenous groups in the past few decades have 
begun to use human rights instruments to assert their own claims for fair 
treatment from the governments to which they are subject.66 
 
59. Id. 
60. Diane Sabom, U.N. Wants to Rule New World Order, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Oct. 23, 
2000, at 21 (citing Kofi Annan). 
61. Stacy, supra note 4, at 2048. 
62. Id. at 2050-51. 
63. Id. at 2045. 
64. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
65. Stacy, supra note 4, at 2039. 
66. See S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move 
Toward the Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 13 (2004) (discussing the 
international human rights regime and its connection to indigenous peoples); Stacy, supra note 4, 
at 2049; see, e.g., United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39 (1985); see also Angela R. Riley, Indian 
Remains, Human Rights: Reconsidering Entitlement under the Native American Graves 
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As scholars, theorists, activists, and world leaders contemplate the 
relationship between sovereignty and human rights, indigenous peoples 
must be regarded with particular care.  Their status—particularly in the 
United States—of sovereigns within a sovereign, makes their situation 
unique, complicated, and worthy of considerable thought. 
It is clear to me that contemporary governments—tribal or otherwise—
cannot ignore the human rights of their members.  Sovereignty should not 
be asserted as an absolute defense to the denial of basic rights and liber-
ties.67  All sovereigns should, in some sense, strive to be “good.”  At the 
same time, however, the obligations of tribal governments to their members 
must be contemplated in the context of the concomitant duties owed to 
tribes by the larger, dominant regime. 
With this in mind, I encourage indigenous nations to be skeptical of 
mandates that they imitate the “good governance” of the developed West.68  
Accordingly, rather than building on prevailing notions of “good 
governance,” I promote, instead, the concept of good (Native) governance, 
of which a core feature is securing the autonomy of Indian nations to 
respond to their communities’ needs consistent with tribal culture and 
tradition.69  Whether this means that tribal governments wholly depart from 
or partially emulate the dominant system is not the critical inquiry.  For me, 
the foundation of good (Native) governance means staying true to our 
indigenous cultures, while simultaneously ensuring our members that we 
are fulfilling the most basic function of all governments—acting on behalf 
of the common good of the people. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Teaching Santa Clara Pueblo in light of contemporary circumstances 
can be a challenging endeavor, but it is, to my mind, a worthwhile one.  As 
Americans and Indians, we are increasingly confronted with the challenges 
 
Protection and Repatriation Act, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49 (2002) (discussing the Inter-
American Court’s decision in favor of the human rights and aboriginal property claims of the 
Awas Tingi people of the Moskito Coast in Nicaragua). 
67. Resnik & Suk, supra note 53, at 1926. 
68. Some scholars contend that “good governance” as promulgated by the developed West is 
simply another form of Western imperialism.  See ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND 
THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 249-50 (2004).  By “good governance” I mean (as the 
term has been used in the literature) a government that possesses certain attributes, usually 
including democracy, the rule of law (encompassing transparency, equality, a separation of 
powers with a competent, independent, and fair judiciary), discretion, and decentralization.  See 
Francis N. Botchway, Good Governance:  The Old, the New, the Principle, and the Elements, 13 
FLA. J. INT’L L. 159, 162 (2001). 
69. For a detailed examination of “good native governance,” see Riley, Good (Native) 
Governance, supra note *. 
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raised by a rapidly changing economic landscape, as well as grave threats to 
our security and dignity.  As such, we must seriously contemplate the 
message of Santa Clara Pueblo.  Though Marshall’s powerful opinion may 
not have specifically articulated it, we know that our sovereignty not only 
empowers us to live autonomously, in ways controlled and directed by us, 
but it simultaneously obligates us to fulfill our responsibility to act on 
behalf of the polity.  This dual-charge is one I believe we are ready to take 
on, and one we ought to readily accept. 
 
